Non-renewable and intermittent renewable energy sources: friends and foes? by baranes, edmond et al.
  
 
Non-renewable and intermittent rene- 
wable energy sources: friends and foes? 
 
Edmond Baranès – Julien Jacqmin –  
Jean-Christophe Poudou 
 





E Baranès, J Jacqmin, JC Poudou (2015). Non-renewable and intermittent renewable energy 









Non-renewable and intermittent renewable energy
sources: friends and foes?⇤
Edmond Baranes †, Julien Jacqmin ‡and Jean-Christophe Poudou§
February 3, 2015
Abstract
This paper studies the links between non-renewable and intermittent renewable
energy sources in the production of electricity. We argue that the relationship
between the price of natural gas and investments in solar and wind capacity is
represented by a bell-shaped curve, as opposed to being linear. Hence, for relatively
low natural gas prices, the two modes of production are substitutes. After a price
threshold is reached, the two are complementary. A theoretical model explains
this as the trade-o↵ resulting from two forces: the input price di↵erential of these
two modes of production and the risks related to the unpredictable nature of
renewable energy. Using U.S. state-level data from 1998 to 2012, we find that this
relationship is robust to various empirical specifications.
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As the world struggles to address climate change, renewable energy is becoming an
increasingly important electricity source. However, non-renewable sources of energy are
still important. As the world moves forward with investments in renewable energy,
such as wind and solar power, it is important to consider the interrelationship between
renewable energy and non-renewable energy sources such as natural gas.
This relationship is complex; it is simultaneously adversarial and cooperative depend-
ing on a number of factors. Natural gas is a direct competitor to renewable energy in
both the contract and spot bulk power markets. At the same time, the operational flexi-
bility of gas-fired generation makes it a promising resource to o↵set natural fluctuations
in sunlight and wind.
Natural gas and intermittent renewables are mostly seen as substitutes, both in the
economic literature and the policy arena. Indeed, considering their intrinsic technical
substitutability within power generation, it is quite natural to assume that an increase in
the price of natural gas will increase incentives to invest in renewable energy generation.
However, the unpredictable intermittency and the comparative advantage in terms of the
input price of renewable energy undoubtably provide some scope for complementarities.
This is particularly true for natural gas, due to its high degree of flexibility in electricity
production. Natural gas generators can almost instantaneously supply the market when
needed.
Other studies have analyzed the complex nexus between natural gas and intermittent
renewable energy. However, the economic literature on the interplay between natural
gas and renewable energy is relatively new. The literature can roughly be divided into
three categories: papers that explore the relationship using a theoretical model, studies
that provide a policy perspective, and papers that empirically analyze the determinants
of investments in renewable energy.
The theoretical literature has largely overlooked the complementary relationship be-
tween renewable energy and natural gas. Most theoretical analysis explains how choices
(in terms of capacity or inputs) between conventional and intermittent generation tech-
nologies are made. Some studies provide a social point of view, such as the partial
equilibrium analysis in Ambec and Crampes (2012) or the general equilibrium frame-
work in Schwerin (2013). Other studies look for strategic market-based explanations,
3such as Bouckaert and De Borger (2013) and Aflaki and Netessine (2012). All these
studies consider thermal-based primary energy sources and intermittent ones to be sub-
stitutes, in that a rise in fuel prices eventually leads to increased investment in renewable
energy.
However, some nuances to this basic property have been identified in the litera-
ture. For example, Bouckaert and De Borger (2013) show that from a strategic point
of view, capacity choices between conventional dispatchable and intermittent generation
technologies (in a duopolistic setting) may be strategic complements when intermittent
generation conditions are unfavorable. But they remain net substitutes at the equilib-
rium, considering capacity cost e↵ects. Using an electricity peak-load pricing model,
Chao (2011) concludes that “the wind generation capacity generally substitutes the in-
vestment in combined cycle GT capacity but complements the investment in gas turbine
units.” In the same vein, Garcia et al. (2012) analyze optimal versus equilibrium mix
of renewable and non-renewable technologies and state that “renewable capacity should
be seen as a substitute to baseload technologies and complementary to peak generation
technologies.” Recently, Ambec and Crampes (2014) find that, in the optimal energy
mix, capacities installed for intermettent sources can be lowered when environmental
damages (or carbon taxes) go over a certain level. This can be interpreted as a comple-
mentary relationship between intermettent sources and fossil fuels when are considered
the impact of di↵erent public policies that aim to decarbonate electricity production.
These conclusions have also been acknowledged in the policy literature. For instance,
Lee et al. (2012) argues that a complementary relationship between natural gas and
renewable energy sources can be established. Technical, environmental, political and
economic considerations explain this claim. From an economic point of view, both
energy sources have di↵erent risk profiles, so they may be complementary portfolio
options. They argue that natural gas price volatility would be balanced by stable (near
zero) generating costs of renewable energy investments and, on the flipside, natural
gas plants’ low up-front costs counterbalance inherent risks due to the intermittency of
renewable generation plants.
This complementary relationship is also studied in the empirical literature on the
determinants of investment in and production of renewable energies (see Delmas and
Montes-Santo (2011), Fabrizio (2013) and Hitaj (2013), among others).1 These papers
1There is also a substantial literature that estimates the energy cross-price elasticities based on
applied production theory. See Stern (2010) for a survey. Our analysis does not consider substitutability
4mainly focus on the impact of various policy tools (such as feed-in tari↵s or renewable
portfolio standards). In some of these studies, the price of natural gas or other fossil fuels
is used as a control variable. Using European data, Marques et al. (2010) find a positive
relationship between the share of contribution of renewables to the energy supply and
the natural gas price, i.e. substitutability. Using U.S. data, Shrimali and Kniefel (2011)
find a significant negative relationship between the share of nonrenewable (wind, solar,
biomass and geothermal) capacity and the total net generation, i.e. complementarity:
“The flexible natural gas based plants are used for overcoming the intermittency issues
inherent in renewable power generation — in particular wind, the dominant renewable
source.” Shrimali and Kniefel (2011, p.4737).
We first develop a model, which shows that the relationship between the production
of electricity using natural gas and renewable intermittent energy is more complex than
originally thought. Using a simple theoretical framework, we analyze the basic trade-
o↵ that an energy producer faces when he plans to build supplementary intermittent
capacity in renewable energy and knowing that the spot natural gas market can be used
to supply the market in the event of production shortfalls.
We find that renewable sources and natural gas can sometimes be complementary,
while at other times be substitutable input factors. More precisely, we find that for
relatively low prices of natural gas, they are substitutes, as the absence of an input cost
for renewable production is less valued. On the other hand, for relatively high natural
gas prices, they are complementary, as the flexibility of a fossil fuel energy source can
circumvent the intermittency of renewable energy sources (as they cannot be stocked
and are not perfectly predictable).
We then examine these predictions using U.S. state-level data from 1998 to 2012,
collected from the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Using capacity investments
in intermittent renewable energy as the dependant variable, we use a panel tobit model to
study its determinants. We focus mainly on renewable energy investment’s relationship
with the observed price of natural gas, using various socioeconomic, electricity market,
policy and tax factors as control variables. In contrast with the literature, we allow for a
more general relationship than a linear one between our two main variables of concern.
Our analysis has implications for policymakers. It suggests a need for more compre-
or complementarity as a technological relationship between inputs or as a strategic link between supply
decisions, but rather through an indirect price e↵ect of a flexible input onto an investment decision. In
some sense, we consider gross substitutability or complementarity.
5hensive policies in the energy sector. It also highlights how various policies influencing
the natural gas market (e.g, the rise of political tensions or the signing of free trade
agreements with major natural gas exporters, the authorization to search and exploit
new gas resources using new technologies, or the introduction of a tax on natural gas)
could impact the renewable energy sector. Based on our conclusions, the relationship
between these two energy sources is more complex than originally thought and depends
in large part on the prevailing market conditions, and more specifically the price of
natural gas.
Section 2 presents a simple theoretical model of generation mix under production
uncertainty. In Section 3, we study the empirical link between the gas and the renewable
markets in the context of electricity production. We conclude in Section 4. Proofs of
results are found in the Appendix.
2 Theoretical Model
We model the basic tradeo↵ an energy producer faces when he (or she) plans to invest
in renewable capacities, knowing that natural gas can be used to supply the market in
instances of excess demand, such as during peak periods or a production failure.
In the model, we aim to reconcile the two contrasting views of the relationship
between natural gas and renewables. While natural gas and renewable power are usually
viewed as competitors, these two energy sources may be also seen as complements that
fit well together in the electric system. The underlying trade-o↵ can be seen through
the contrasting e↵ects the natural gas price may produce on the investment level of
capacity in renewable. In the following, we consider that natural gas and renewable
energy can be substitutable energy sources when the natural gas price positively a↵ects
capacity in renewable energy. In contrast, they can be considered as complementary
when an increase in the natural gas price reduces capacity in renewables. Similar types
of trade-o↵s have already been analyzed in more general microeconomic settings (see for
instance Blair (1974) and Abel and Eberly (1994)).
The main features of our framework are twofold: First, instead of a↵ecting input
prices, uncertainty a↵ects the maximal level of output achievable using a given tech-
nology (in this case, renewable capacity). Second, at the margin, the more secure and
flexible source of supply (here, natural gas) is always more expensive than the risky or
6unsecured technology (here, the renewable one). Hence, the energy producer will bal-
ance the benefit of producing electricity at a zero marginal cost with the risk of having
to use the spot market to produce electricity from natural gas.
Let k   0 be the renewable capacity investment in electricity from the intermittent
sources (in terms of capital cost).2 We assume that this investment is normalized to
represent an additional capacity that generates f(k) kWh, where f(k) is a twice di↵er-
entiable, positive, increasing and concave production function, so that f(0) = 0. We
denote   = f 1 such that  (y) depicts the necessary renewable capacity to generate
y kWh. This assumption implies that investment opportunities exhibit non-increasing
returns in terms of generation. We denote the intermittence factor by x 2 {0, 1}, such
that Prob(x = 1) = ⇡ (windy, sunny) and Prob(x = 0) = 1   ⇡ (cloudy, gloomy, lull).
Therefore, the available electricity from renewable source is xf(k).
The natural gas price (i.e. on spot markets) is assumed to be certain, or equal to
its common knowledge expected value, and is denoted by w, while qx denotes the short-
term supply of natural gas (which is adjustable). At the time of delivery, the energy
demanded (which is, for simplicity, deterministic and exogenous) is given by Q > 0, and
the output price of electricity is p > w.
Let U : R+ ! R, x 7! U(x) be the firm owner’s von Neumann–Morgenstern utility
function. U is twice di↵erentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave. We then
denote r (⇧) =  U 00 (⇧) /U 0 (⇧) > 0, the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion
for a profit ⇧.
For a competitive producer, the problem is to choose ex-ante q0, q1 and k such that




⇡U (pQ  wq1   k) + (1  ⇡)U (pQ  wq0   k) .
Let us consider the state-contingent decision q⇤x that the producer could take if the
state of nature x occurs. As derived in the Appendix, due to the cost of q⇤x in each
state of nature and the covered market condition, we have that q⇤0 = Q and q
⇤
1 =
max{0, Q   f(k)}. Thus, the competitive producer’s problem can be reduced to the
2We assume that (an infinite amount of) gas turbines have been already installed and that these
costs are sunk.
7choice of k ex-ante such that:
max
k
⇡U (pQ  w (max{0, Q  f(k)})  k) + (1  ⇡)U ((p  w)Q  k) .
Now our aim is to understand the features of the solution of this problem and to study
how the optimal renewable capacity investment k varies with respect to the natural gas
price w. We focus on the case where the renewable capacity is less than the realized
demand, namely when k⇤ <  (Q),3 the first-order condition for an interior solution
becomes:
(1) ⇡ (f 0(k⇤)w   1)U 0 (B) = (1  ⇡)U 0 (A)
where A = (p  w)Q   k⇤ and B = A + wf (k⇤). This condition has the following
interpretation. Whenever it is optimal for the producer to invest in renewable capacities,
he balances the marginal expected net reward of having this capacity available to produce
electricity at a zero unit cost when demand occurs (i.e. ⇡(f 0(k)w 1)) and the marginal
expected cost of having to buy extra natural gas on the spot market (which depends on
his attitude towards risk, U 0 (.)).
At this stage, our main objective is to assess when k⇤ is an increasing or a decreasing
function of w. In other words, can renewable intermittent energy and natural gas be
substitutable or complementary input factors? In the following, we argue that this is
intrinsically related to the intermittent nature of renewable energy and the supply risk
it creates.
First, we state a result that gives su cient conditions for intermittent energy and
natural gas to be substitutes.
Result 1. Renewable energy and natural gas are substitutes if at least one of the follow-
ing three conditions are met: (i) there is no intermittency (ii) the producer is risk-neutral
or (iii) the natural gas price is very low.
Proof. See appendix
Conditions reported in Result 1 can be viewed as limiting cases under which re-
3When the renewable capacity investment is su cient to cover the realized demand, the optimal
investment will be k⇤ =  (Q), and all the energy demand is served through the costless renewable
capacity.
8newable energy and natural gas are substitutes in the the energy mix. Here, k⇤ is a
decreasing function of the natural gas price w. First, when intermittency is not an is-
sue4 then there is no risk to supply due to cloudy, overcast or non-windy weather (i.e.
⇡ = 1). In this context, the producer faces a trade-o↵ between the monetary cost of
investing in new renewable capacities and the benefit obtained with certainty from not
having to purchase this energy from the gas spot market. This opportunity return is
becoming more important when the gas price increases, so is the marginal investment in
renewables. Energy factors are then substitutes. Second, if the producer is risk-neutral,
the same trade-o↵ is again at play, except that the opportunity return is taken in ex-
pectation, proportionally reduced by the probability of sunshine or wind. Finally, if the
natural gas price is very low (say below a given threshold), the previous opportunity
return is nil, so is the investment in renewable capacities. Thus a slight increase of the
natural gas price above this threshold makes the investment in renewables profitable,
which implies subtitutability between both factors.
The contrepart of Result 1 is that whenever the producer is risk-averse, intermittence
is an issue or natural gas prices are not very low, complementarity between renewable
energy and natural gas is a possibility. Our second result gives su cient conditions for
intermittent energy and natural gas to be complements in the energy mix.





















Result 2 illustrates that depending on the strength of risk aversion, the degree of
intermittency and the level of natural gas price, renewable capacity investments can
be decreasing as the natural gas price is increasing. In this setting, the marginal cost
related to a lack of wind or sunlight increases faster than the marginal benefit of having
access to a free input.
We can further interpret the inequality condition in Eq. (2). The left-side of the in-
equality is the product of three elements that can be viewed as the degree of flexibility
the energy producer faces. Indeed it is respectively composed of the probability rate
4For example, there could be technological advances that make it possible to store wind or solar
energy of the electricity it produces.
9of sunlight or wind (⇡/ (1  ⇡)), the marginal rate of decrease in renewable production
due to the investment k when the natural gas price rises (f 0(k)/f(k)) and the marginal
rate of substitution between profits in both state of nature (that is in case of lack of
renewable energy source, the rise in profits needed to compensate the monetary loss
when sun shines or wind blows due to a lower renewable capacity investment). Hence
when the solar or wind capacity investment diminishes, the left hand side of Eq. (2)
describes the ability with which the competitive energy supplier can balance profit losses
in case of sunshine or wind by gains in the contrary case. Moreover, one can see that the
marginal rate of substitution between profits decreases as natural gas prices rise, since
B decreases less than A when w increases. As a result, the degree of flexibility becomes
lower as the gas price rises.
Second, the right-side of the inequality can be viewed as the degree of risk aversion
the energy producer exhibits, as it involves the di↵erence of Arrow-Pratt coe cients of
absolute risk aversion for both state of nature weighted by a corresponding risk exposure
ratio.
Then, one can now argue that whenever the degree of flexibility is weaker than the
degree of risk aversion, the energy producer will have an incentive to lower renewable
capacity investments when natural gas input prices rise. In that case, renewable and
fossil energy cources can be viewed as complementary. Then, in some circumstances it
is more likely that the degree of risk aversion overcomes the degree of flexibility of the
producer for high gas prices. Moreover one can expect that above a price threshold, an
increase in the price of natural gas will lead to a decrease in investments in renewable
capacities. In our general framework, it is not possible to provide conditions about this
price threshold without considering a given class of von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function.
In the following, we give one example for which Result 2 occurs. From the discussion
above, let us consider a constant absolute risk aversion utility function, where U (z) =
  exp( ✓z) and ✓   0, where ✓ > 0 is the risk aversion parameter and the linear
























✓(wa  1)   kˆ(w)
 
.
We see that there is a unique w¯ : kˆ0(w¯) = 0 when kˆ(w¯) = 1✓(w¯a 1) (it is a transcendental







Renewable capacity investment (k) as a function of the price of natural gas (w)
The black line denotes capacity. The red line denotes the electricity demand.
In this example, the two energy sources can be seen as substitutes when the natural
gas price is su ciently low, and complements otherwise. This result is a testable pre-
diction; the following section presents data and an empirical model to see if the model’s
results hold in the real world.
5A similar shape has been obtained for a DARA utility function, U(z) = ln(1 + ✓z), where ✓ > 0.
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3 Empirical Model
We now study the empirical link between non-renewable and renewable electricity mar-
kets. More precisely, we focus on the relationship between investments in intermittent
renewable methods of producing electricity and the input price of a non-renewable tech-
nology (in our case, natural gas).
Figure 2 is a scatterplot showing the relationship between the natural gas price
and renewable capacity investments for 49 U.S. states between 1998-2012, as well as a
quadratic fit (only considering strictly positive renewable capacity investments). The
graphic suggests that a non-linear relationship is more plausible than a linear one. This
observation is consistent with our theoretical model, which suggests that a bell-shaped
curve would provide a better fit for the link between the price of natural gas and re-
newable capacity investments. It confirms the idea stated in Results 1 and 2 that,
for relatively high natural gas prices, these two energy sources can be complementary.
In what follows, we show that this suggestive evidence is robust to various empirical
approaches.
Figure 2
Scatterplot of (log of) renewable capacity investments and average natural gas price for all
U.S. states between 1998 and 2012 and a quadratic fit (with conficence intervals of 95%)
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3.1 Methodology
To test the main result of our theoretical framework, we use U.S. state-level data from
1998 to 2012.6 One major concern with our data is the high number of censored obser-
vations, as investments in additional capacity are bounded to be weakly positive. Out
of our 732 observations,7 445 observations have a renewable capacity investment equal
to zero, i.e. there were no investment in renewable capacities during these years/states.
Empirical methods such as random and fixed e↵ects panel models result in biased
and inconsistent estimates, as they are not able to account for the possible qualitative
di↵erence between corner and strictly positive observations. To accommodate for these
non-negative dependent variables, we use a censored tobit model for panel data with
random e↵ects. Hence, our zero-valued observations are assumed to be true zeros (i.e.
the e↵ective outcome that is observed which is characterized as a corner solution) and
there is no rounding to zero of investment below a positive value.8
Let the vector Xit represent all our explanatory variables, including the natural gas
price variables, in a state i = 1, ..., N in time t = 1, ..., T . We can define the latent,
unobservable, renewable capacity investment y⇤it as:
y⇤it = ↵i +Xit  + ✏it
where the error terms ✏it are i.i.d. N (0,  2e) and the random e↵ects ↵i are i.i.d N (0,  2a).
We estimate a censored panel tobit model where this latent variable determines the value






0 if y⇤it  0
6Our database can be downloaded from our website.
7From our original sample of 735 observations, we exclude three observations that are missing the
price of natural gas. Despite this, we analyze our data as a balanced panel.
8In our robustness analysis, we depart three times from this approach. First, we transform our
dependent variable into a dummy variable, which describes whether or not new investments have oc-
curred. To analyze this case, we use a probit model. Second, there are no statistics that allow the
fixed e↵ects to be conditioned out of the likelihood (Stata (2009)). Hence, it is not possible to compute
conditional fixed e↵ects. Despite being biased and inconsistent, we compute unconditional fixed e↵ect
estimators. Third, we use compute conventional fixed e↵ect estimators. In each cases, we show that
our main results hold. Another complementary approach would be to estimate a self-selection model.
Unfortunately, it is unclear which variable plays a role in the decision to invest and not in the decision
of how much to invest in renewable capacities.
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Since it is impossible to compute fixed e↵ects with this approach, we control for un-
observed heterogeneity using a random heterogeneity-specific component for each state.
This assumption implies that state- specific e↵ects are uncorrelated with our indepen-
dent variables. The problem of endogeneity will be further discussed in our robustness
analysis.
Due to the absence of closed-form solutions, the log likelihood is computed using a
numerical approximation (Gaussian quadrature). Following a change in the number of
quadrature points, estimates tend to be unchanged. This can be explained by our sample
size and large within-group observations. Hence, our results seem to be reliable. In order
to estimate the variance-covariance matrix of our estimator, we apply the bootstrap
procedure for the standard errors with 200 repetitions. Further robustness checks are
derived at the end of this section.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Dependent Variables
Our analysis focuses on capacity investments, as opposed to accumulated investments,
market share or generation because it highlights better the outcome of our economic
decision. Using this dependent variable allows us to more clearly analyze the outcome
of the investment decision, net of previous years. It is also a more ideal variable than
electricity generation because capacity investments are not influenced by unpredictable
year-to-year weather conditions; as with its zero marginal cost, renewable energies are
the first in the merit order of electricity generation. Finally, in line with our theoretical
model, we focus on aggregate investments in two renewable energy sources: solar and
wind. They are both non-flexible intermittent and renewable sources of production.
Compared with electricity produced from hydropower, biofuel or biomass, they do not
create large negative environmental externalities through their capacity installments,
the production of electricity or the supply of inputs. We use state-level data as states
are a coherent entity with respect to the energy policies implemented.
Our data comes from U.S. Energy Information Administration (2014). It has the
double advantage of having state-level data on both renewable capacity investments and
natural gas prices. The information is obtained from the EIA-860 form. To consider
both the increasing number of units producing electricity and the increase in productivity
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observed over time, we multiply the number of generators installed by their nameplate
capacity (i.e. maximum output of a generator expressed in megawatts). As zeros and
positive values are analyzed separately, We take its log of the positive values as the
original data is heavily right-skewed and has a non-normal kurtosis.
3.2.2 Independent Variables
Our focus is on the price of natural gas, which is the unit price of the main input in
the production of non-renewable electricity. Other independent variables act as controls
and are classified into three categories (socioeconomic, electricity market and policy/tax
factors). This is a stark contrast with Marques et al. (2010) or Shrimali and Kniefel
(2011), which mainly focused on the impact of tax and policy tools on renewable energies
using, among other things, prices as control variables. We will also consider a more
general specification than them.
We now provide detailed descriptions of our independent variables.
1. Price of natural gas
Our natural gas price data is from EIA (2013). It is the average price paid (in
nominal dollars per million Btu) by the electric power sector for natural gas for
each state and year combination. It includes the cost of natural gas as well as
insurance, freight and taxes. As for our dependent variable, we use yearly data as
it is more appropriate to understand investment behaviors which occur in the long
run.
To study the relationship between the input price of natural gas and investment in
renewable energy, we consider both a linear and a quadratic term. As there might
be lags between the price observed (or estimations of it) at the time an investment
is decided upon and the time when the capacity investment is available, we include
up to four-year lags. The economic explanation for using lags comes from the
red tap or construction timing and delays related with the investments. Due to
multicollinearity between these price variables, we focus on our most representative
results, which use a one-year lag.9
9Due to the quadratic terms and the lags, up to 10 gas price variables were simultaneously considered.
Our results hold further using no lag or two-years lag but standard errors are impacted, leading to lower
significance levels.
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2. Electricity market factors
The first three factors (state size, wind availability and sun availability) are all
measures of the feasibility of installing wind and solar farms. These are the only
variables that are held constant across all years in our data.
One would expect states of larger size to host more investments. Wind availability
is the wind generation potential for each state at an 80 meter height, with capacity
factors of at least 30% measured in TWh/year, as provided by National Renewable
Energy Laboratory (2011). Sun availability is the solar radiation for flat-plate
collectors facing south at a fixed tilt (kWh/m2/day), as measured in the largest
city of each state (National Renewable Energy Laboratory (2010)). We expect
these variables to positively influence our dependent variable.
Growth in electricity sales is the growth in the amount of electricity sold for each
state compared with the previous year. It is a measure of the incremental demand
for electricity. Electricity price is the average price of electricity sold by state
producers of electricity. Since the price of electricity is a good proxy for the per-
unit returns derived from installed capacities, the coe cient of this variable is
expected to be positive.
Production % renew. energy and production % nuclear energy represent, respec-
tively, the market share of electricity produced using intermittent and renewable
sources and using nuclear sources. Data for both variables is from the U.S. En-
ergy Information Administration (2014) database. Due to agglomeration e↵ects
in the production of renewable energy, the production share of renewable energy
is expected to be positive. This variable also shows how the accumulated stock
of renewable energy investment influences new investments. Conversely, nuclear
energy’s share of production is expected to be negative, as it is complicated to
easily switch from one source of production to renewable energy.
Experience with ISO/RTO is the cumulative number of years (including frac-
tions of years) that a state has been active in a Regional Transmission Organi-
zation (RTO)/Independent System Operator (ISO). These institutions facilitate
the transmission of electricity between states. Computed from Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (2014), this variable is a proxy for the quality of a state’s
electricity grid and how easy it is to switch from one source of electricity production
to another. Due to the intermittent nature of renewable energy, more experience in




The first two socioeconomic factors, population and GDP per capita, are obtained
from U.S. Census Bureau (2014) and U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (2014),
respectively. Population is the number of inhabitants (in million) and GDP per
capita is the nominal GDP per capita (in thousand $). Both coe cients are ex-
pected to be positive. The first because it is a proxy for the total demand for
renewable energy, and the second because emission reductions, which tend to re-
sult from increased reliance on renewable energy, are a normal good.
Using electoral data, the other two socioeconomic variables are proxies for the
tastes of residents. Democrat governor is a dummy variable, which takes the value
1 when the state governor is a Democrat. LofCV indicator is an index based on
the scorecard produced by League of Conservative Voters (2014), which lists the
“greenness” of state representatives’ at the federal congress on environmental is-
sues using voting data. It is a categorical/ordinal variable between 0 and 3, where
the most environmental friendly states are awarded a 3 and the least environmen-
tally friendly are awarded a 0. Both these variables are expected to be positively
correlated with investment in renewable energy capacity.
4. Policy and tax factors
To facilitate the interpretation of our main results, we use two aggregate variables
based on information derived from the Database on State Incentives for Renewables
and E ciency DSIRE (2014). Policy is the number of regulatory and policy tools
(among public benefit funds, renewable portfolio standard, net metering system,
interconnected standard, required green power option and feed-in tari↵) in place
to promote investments in renewable energy in each year for each state. Tax is
the number of financial incentives available (from personal, corporate, sales and
property tax measures). We expect that these two categorical variables have a
positive impact on additional investments.
The summary statistics of our dependent and independent variables can be found in
Table A1 of the Appendix.
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3.3 Main results
The main results of our paper are provided in Table 1. Each of the five regressions looks
at the determinants of renewable capacity investments. The first column displays our
base model which only includes dependent variables related with the electricity market.
The linear and quadratic term related with natural gas price are both significant at
a 1% threshhold. The first is positive and the second is negative. This supports our
theoretical result that the relationship between natural gas price and renewable capacity
investments is non-linear. Hence, we have an inverted-U-shaped relationship between
the two variables. In line with our model, this means that for relatively low prices, a
marginal increase in price tends to increase investments in renewable energy. Above this
price threshhold, the reverse holds and they are complements, as a marginal increase in
prices tends to decrease investments in renewables.
In regression (1), the coe cient estimates for the electricity market factors are in
line with what we have predicted in the previous subsection. Wind availability and
sun availability are both positive, but only the former is significant.10 Larger states
host more investments but this is not significant. States facing an increasing demand
for electricity tend to invest less in renewable energies. One explanation can be that
investments in technologies with more flexibility are preferred as they are a safer way to
secure the supply of the electricity demanded. An increase in electricity price means a
higher return for each capacity unit invested. This coe cient is positive and significative.
Previous investments in renewable energies call for more investments but this coe cient
is not significative. On the contrary, when nuclear energies have a prominent place in
the production of electricity, less investments are taking place. This is due to the lack
of flexibility of nuclear energies, which coupled with renewable energies, can lead to a
problem in term of security of electricity supply. Having an experience with ISO/RTO
helps improving the quality of the grid, and subsequently the switch from one source
of energy to another, this has a positive and significant impact on renewable capacity
investments.
Regression (2) introduces other important covariates related with the socioeconomic
context. This does not change our previous results. We observe that a higher GDP per
capita leads to more important investments. One explanation is that wealthier states
become more concerned about the quality of the environment. One way to improve it
10This can be explained by the marginal importance of solar energy compared to wind energy, as it
accounts for about 4% of our renewable capacity investments.
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Table 1
Renewable capacity investments as a continuous variable (log of): Panel data Tobit model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Natural gas price 1.822*** 1.283** 1.254** 1.984** -0.043
(0.525) (0.576) (0.575) (0.804) (0.237)
Natural gas price (squared) -0.153*** -0.118*** -0.109** -0.160***
(0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.06)
Wind availability 0.112** 0.116* 0.095* 0.104** 0.108**
(0.056) (0.063) (0.051) (0.052) (0.053)
Sun availability 1.368 1.333 0.516 -0.966 -1.014
(2.552) (2.311) (1.892) (1.969) (2.018)
State size 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Growth in electricity sales -10.319** -13.068*** -12.459*** 1.685 2.767
(5.225) (5.045) (4.808) (6.29) (6.127)
Electricity price 1.218*** 0.798*** 0.374 0.03 0.046
(0.228) (0.25) (0.246) (0.253) (0.26)
Production % renew. energy 16.003 8.421 4.129 -7.993 -7.493
(12.933) (14.01) (13.312) (10.795) (10.674)
Production % nuclear energy -12.384** -12.173* -10.409** -7.68 -8.288*
(5.918) (6.254) (5.289) (4.694) (4.82)
Experience with ISO/RTO 0.502*** 0.446*** 0.364*** 0.18* 0.158
(.0113) (0.123) (0.105) (0.101) (0.105)
GDP per capita 0.16** 0.093 -0.042 -0.041
(0.079) (0.06) (0.067) (0.068)
Population 0.16 0.157 0.214 0.220
(0.274) (0.201) (0.15) (0.15)
Democrat governor -0.03 -0.086 0.114 0.073
(0.673) (0.653) (0.619) (0.624)
LofCV indicator 0.344 - 0.022 0.183 0.159
(0.279) (0.29) (0.277) (0.279)
Policy 0.741** 0.192 0.178
(0.306) (0.302) (0.292)
Tax 1.117*** 0.445 0.423
(0.316) (0.313) (0.319)
Constant -23.408** -25.569*** -17.881** -9.788 -5.152
(9.286) (8.569) (7.165) (9.173) (8.96)
Year fixed e↵ects No No No Yes Yes
Log likelihood -996.347 -990.239 -975.114 -932.710 -937.517
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Sample: 732 observations - 49 states - period 1998-2012 (including 445 left-censored observations)
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is to invest in renewable energies. Population, democrat governor and LofCV indicator
have all an impact on our dependant variable which is not significant.
Regression (3) also includes our policy and tax factors. They are both positive and
significant. Our previous results remain for the most unchanged.11 Their sign remains
unchanged but electricity price and GDP per capita are not significant anymore. This
is due to their high degree of correlation with policy, repectively 0.52 and 0.58. The
change in sign of LofCV indicators can also be explained by its correlation with policy.
Regression (4) includes in addition year e↵ects. By using a dummy for each years, we
are able to capture unobserved time-invariant e↵ects. This can reduce potential concerns
about time-varying macroeconomic e↵ects which have an impact on investments and are
not included in our model. It also captures some of the e↵ects created by technological
changes in the renewable sector which have made capacities less costly and/or more
productive, information which is, unfortunately, not available to include in our model.
Due to this reason, this is our preferred regression. This is confirmed by the likelihood
ratio test. By considering these year e↵ects, we have that our main results remain.
Natural gas price and Natural gas price (squared) are respectively positive and negative
at the 5% and 1% level. With their respective values, the maximum of the inverted-U
curve is at around 6.2$ per million Btu, while the average is 5.3.12 Note that this also
impacts some of our coe cients. This is due to the whithin variance of the variables
which is now captured by these yearly dummies.
Compared with specification (4), specification (5) only allows a linear relationship
between natural gas price and additional renewable capacity. This linear term has a
negative sign, meaning that an increase in price leads to less investments. However, this
is not significant, i.e. we cannot claim that these two intermittent sources of energy are
complementary. Hence, our data is better estimated using both a linear and a quadratic
term.13
In conclusion, these results tend to confirm our theoretical prediction. While, for
relatively low natural gas price, renewable energy and natural gas are substitutable
inputs, they are complementary for high natural gas prices. This is in line with Results
11Note that considering individually the policies composing these aggregate indicators does not impact
our results. Results are available upon request.
12Remark that this is very close to the maximum of the quadratic fit of our data pictured in Figure
2 which does not consider any control variables.
13Adding a further cubic and quartic term does not impact this conclusion. Results are available
upon request.
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1 and 2 from our theoretical model. Our theoretical explanation is that for high prices
of natural gas, the cost associated with the unpredictable intermittency of renewable
energy cannot outweigh the cost savings from using a freely available input.
3.4 Robustness analysis
We examine the robustness of our results using alternative specifications, the regressions
of which are shown in Table 2. Regression (4) is our benchmark case. We use di↵erent
dependent and independent variables as well as alternative estimation procedures. Fi-
nally we discuss the issue of endogeneity. Our robustness analysis confirms, and further
strengthens, our main results. Due to the various approaches used, it is complicated to
compare the parameter estimates of our control variables but they tend to be similar
accross specifications.14 Eventual changes can be explained by the use of fixed e↵ects, of
other estimators or of other dependent variables. Hence, in this analysis, we will focus
on our main variables of concern.
First, in our main results, we consider a random component for each state, to account
for state-specific conditions potentially impacting the dependent variable. With tobit
panel data, it is not possible to consider state fixed e↵ects. However, it is possible
to compute unconditional state fixed e↵ects, although these estimates are biased and
inconsistent. Results are shown in regression (6). We see that the parameter estimate
for natural gas price is positive and for natural gas price (squared) is negative. Both are
significant at the 1% level. This is in line with our main result.
In regression (7) and (8), we examine the robustness of our results with respect
to di↵erent independent variables. First, using the same data, we redefine renewable
capacity investment as a dummy variable, where 1 denotes that an investment was
made. Due to this change, we use a di↵erent estimation strategy. We examine it using
a panel probit model with random e↵ects. We see from regression (6), where marginal
e↵ects at the means are computed, that the estimates for the linear and squared terms
of price of natural gas have the expected signs and are both significant at, respectively,
a 10% and 5% level. Even though the levels of the estimates di↵er from the ones before,
they tend to give a maximum of the inverted-U relationship at a similar price level.
Next, in regression (8), we look at the determinants of changes in electricity produc-
14Remark that the price threshhold, defined as the maximum of the quadratic relationship between




Dependent variable (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Renewable Energy Capacity Capacity Production Capacity Capacity
(log of) Tobit Probit Tobit Tobit FE
Natural gas price 1.750*** 0.508* 2.103* 1.245***
(0.667) (0.276) (1.114) (0.353)
Natural gas price (squared) -0.148*** -0.045** -0.155** -0.111***
(0.05) (0.02) (0.079) (0.027)
Average petroleum price 0.162**
(0.078)
Wind availability 0.014*** 0.159* 0.111**
(0.004) (0.091) (0.051)
Sun availability -0.038 0.267 -1.143
(0.146) (3.28) (1.956)
State size 0.001** 0.006 0.001
(0.0003) (0.028) (0.014)
Growth in electricity sales 3.194 -2.105 -17.89** 2.964 2.624
(5.721) ( 2.058) (8.63) (6.112) (3.01)
Electricity price 0.321 -0.110*** 0.557 0.076 -0.066
(0.253) (0.04) (0.412) (0.27) (0.198)
Production % renew. energy -13.489* 58.089*** 0.301 -7.622 24.02**
(7.22) (13.202) (19.441) (10.702) (11.782)
Production % nuclear energy -2.942 -0.578 -12.715 -8.864* 0.987
(9.331) (0.357) (9.828) (4.699) (11.782)
Experience with ISO/RTO 0.156* 0.002 0.522** 0.217** 0.146*
(0.086) (0.024) (0.237) (0.103) (0.075)
GDP per capita -0.111 0.015 0.101 -0.055 -0.028
(0.069) (0.009) (0.125) (0.069) (0.059)
Population -0.440 0.041*** 0.137 0.273* 0.606
(0.379) (0.012) (0.384) (0.144) (0.408)
Democrat governor -0.040 0.061 2.13** 0.119 0.112
(0.415) (0.129) (1.052) (0.629) (0.347)
LofCV indicator 0.082 0.202*** 0.463 0.094 0.025
(0.289) (0.078) (0.632) (0.276) (0.183)
Policy -0.043 0.131** 0.729 0.181 0.265
(0.217) (0.059) (0.604) (0.277) (0.231)
Tax 0.254 0.079 1.348** 0.381 0.312
(0.307) (0.055) (0.671) (0.33) (0.231)
Constant 302.629 -3.264*** -24.667 -5.289 -6.215
(256.085) (1.109) (13.363) (8.66) (3.321)
Year fixed e↵ects Yes Yes No Yes Yes
State fixed e↵ects Yes No No No Yes
Log likelihood -838.527 -275.069 -1298.47 -933.901 /
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Sample: 732 observations - 49 states - period 1998-2012
(6) and (9) Renewable capacity investment as a dependent variable (445 left-censored observations)
(7) Renewable capacity investment dummy as a dependent variable
(8) Renewable energy production (408 left-censored observations)
(10) Renewable capacity investment (log(a+ y) with a = 0.3 as a dependent variable
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tion from renewable sources instead of renewable capacity investments, also using data
from U.S. Energy Information Administration (2014). Again, we find similar results as
before. Note however that standard errors are negatively impacted whenever we consider
year fixed e↵ects in the regression, as conjectural factors are more important when we
consider production rather than investment as a dependent variable.
In regression (9), compared with our benchmark case, we use the price of a di↵erent
mode of production. we use the average petroleum price (EIA (2013)) instead of the
price of natural gas. Looking at cases with both a linear and a quadratic term and
with only a linear term, we find that the specification with the best fit and the most
significant result is the one with a lag of one year and only a linear term. We see that
an increase in the average petroleum price leads to a increase in investments. This
means that renewable energies and petroleum are substitutes. In light with Lee et al.
(2012), this can be explained by the lack of flexibility of petroleum in circumventing the
intermittence problem created by renewable energy sources.
In regression (10), we abstract from the problem created by the high degree of cen-
sorship in our data by estimating a panel data with fixed-e↵ects. As zero and positive
outcomes are not treated separately anymore, we have added a constant (a = 0.3) before
taking the log of our renewable capacity investment dependent variables. This method,
often used in the trade literature interested in the determinants of foreign direct invest-
ments, prevent us from omitting zero outcomes from our sample. We use Huber/White
estimators to estimate the variance-covariance matrix. We find that, again, our two
main variables of concern have their expected signs. Price of natural gas is positive and
price of natural gas (squared) is negative. Both are significant at the 1% threshhold.
Further, we have also excluded from our sample states without any positive observation
for our dependent variables, i.e. without renewable capacity investments. Our main
results hold.15
One final important issue to discuss is endogeneity. In our context, the main potential
source of endogeneity is reverse causality. As argued by Wiser and Bolinger (2007),
renewable energies can impact the natural gas market, as it shifts its demand. On the
one hand, renewable energy investments could reduce the overall demand for natural
gas, leading to downward pressure on prices. On the other hand, the unpredictable
intermittency of renewable energy could cause spikes in natural gas demand when there
is no wind nor sunlight. These temporary shifts can lead to increased price dispersion.
15Results are available upon request.
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Hence, the overall impact on the price of natural gas is indeterminate.
There are several factors that can explain why endogeneity does not undermine our
main results. First, the scope for reverse causality is limited by the fact that we look
at marginal rather than accumulated investments in renewable capacities. The impact
on the natural gas price is much more limited due to the relatively small level of annual
investments compared with accumulated investments. Second, our main specification
considers a one-year lag between the price of natural gas and renewable capacity in-
vestments. It is unlikely that price expectations in the gas market are impacted by
investments that will produce electricity in a year, especially considering the important
cost of natural gas storage. Finally, the fact that we look at long-run investment be-
havior (in opposition to short-run production behavior) and that we use yearly data
undermines the scope for reverse causality. In our sample, on average, only one percent
of the electricity production comes from renewable sources.
However, there is the possibility of an omitted variable bias created by a third variable
not included in our model, which influences both the natural gas price and renewable
capacity investments. It is unclear in which direction this could bias our estimators.
In our context, this could be due to unobserved policies (such as a decision to phase
out nuclear power) or demand/supply shocks (such as a technical problem that makes
it impossible to use a dam or a nuclear power plant). Note however that some of these
unobserved factors are captured by our year fixed e↵ects.
4 Conclusion
This paper provides new theoretical and empirical insights into the relationship between
renewable methods of producing electricity (focusing on wind and solar power), and
non-renewable methods. We study the degree of substitutability and complementarity
between these two sources of energy. This relationship is not linear. Due to the un-
predictable intermittency from these renewable natural resources, natural gas can be
complementary, as it can e↵ectively supply the market on demand. Using U.S. state-
level data, we find that an increase in the price of natural gas can lead to a decrease in
investment in renewable energy capacity.
Our theoretical model provides an explanation for the bell-shaped relationship be-
tween the price of natural gas and renewable capacity investments. It highlights the
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trade-o↵ between the relative input price advantage of renewable energy and the uncer-
tainty related to the unpredictable intermittency of these energy sources, which must
be replaced in the blink of an eye when there are shortfalls. We argue that this sec-
ond force increases proportionally more with the price of natural gas, giving scope for
complementarities.
Our results suggest that a comprehensive approach to energy supply is appropriate.
Investments in renewable and non-renewable energy should be considered in tandem
due to the interrelationship between these two electricity sources. It is essential that
the renewable energy sector does not ignore the natural gas market. Direct policies
(such as taxes or subsidies) or indirect policies that a↵ect the natural gas market can
impact the renewable energy sector significantly. New free trade agreements or tense
political relationships with major natural gas exporting countries, as well as policies
towards natural gas exploration and exploitation can have an e↵ect on investments in
the renewable sector.
Precisely defining the price threshold at which natural gas becomes a complement
instead of a substitute is outside the scope of this paper. This could be particularly in-
teresting with a more comprehensive database. Another issue concerns the high quantity
of data censoring. Another, complementary, estimation strategy would be to consider it
with a self-selection approach a la Heckman. However, in the U.S. context, it is unclear
which variable plays a role in the selection step and not in the intensity step. One way
to avoid this indentification problem would be to use the methodology developed by
Raymond et al. (2010). We hope that our work will lead to further research on these
issues.
Another interesting question concerns how the relationship between natural gas and
renewable energy will evolve over time. Is there scope for a higher degree of complemen-
tarity between these two sources of electricity? Further investments in the electricity
grid and technological advances will most likely improve the interconnectivity between
the various types of electricity, both at the state and national level. However, this might
be o↵set by the evolution of technologies related to the storage of electricity/renewable
power or the imperfectly predictable nature of renewable energy sources. It will be
interesting to further analyze how these two forces will evolve.
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Appendix
Contingent decisions. Ex post, if x = 1 then profit will be ⇧1 = pQ  wq1   k with
q1   0 because the renewable capacity investments k are used to serve the demand. If
f(k)   Q, that is k     (Q), q⇤1 = argmaxq1 ⇧1 = 0. If k <   (Q), then q1   Q   f (k)
because capacity k is too limited to meet overall demand Q. We have that q⇤1 = Q f(k).
As a result, q⇤1 = max{Q   f(k), 0}. If x = 0, then profit will be ⇧0 = pQ   wq0   k,
with q⇤0   Q such that q⇤0 = argmaxq0 Q⇧0 = Q.
Proof of Result 1. Using standard results from the comparative statics theory (see for
instance Amir (2005)), we know that k⇤(w) will be increasing (or respectively decreasing)
on a given domain, if the expected profit ⇧ exhibits an increasing di↵erences (respectively
decreasing di↵erences) with respect to (k, w) in that domain. As ⇧ is assumed to be twice
di↵erentiable, increasing di↵erences occurs when @
2⇧
@k@w > 0 and decreasing di↵erences
occurs when @
2⇧




= ⇡f 0(k)U 0 (B) + (1  ⇡)QU 00 (A)  ⇡ (f 0(k)w   1) (Q  f(k))U 00 (B)
Point i is proven as follows. If the renewable energy is not intermittent (when ⇡ = 1),
from Eq. (A.1) we have that @
2⇧
@k@w = f
0(k)U 0 (B)   (f 0(k)w   1) (Q   f(k))U 00 (B) > 0
whenever f 0(k)w   1 > 0. As shown in (1), this is true at the optimum.
If the producer is risk-neutral (i.e. U 0 is constant), from Eq. (A.1) we have @
2⇧
@k@w =
⇡f 0(k)U 0 (B) > 0. On this basis, renewable energy and natural gas are substitutes in
the producer’s electricity mix. This proves Point (ii).
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Finally, when k⇤ = 0, to take into account the corner condition, Eq. (1) can be rewritten
as:
[⇡f 0(0)w   1]U 0 ((p  w)Q))  0
From this, one can define w = 1/ (f 0(0)⇡) so that for w 2 [0, w], renewable capacity
investment is equal to zero. The natural gas is too cheap to make the investment into
renewable capacities valuable. Hence in a right neighborhood of w, then k⇤ > 0, so by
continuity k⇤ is necessary locally increasing. This proves point (iii).
Proof of Result 2. From Eq. (A.1) and using Eq. (1), we can rewrite @
2⇧
@k@w and show
when it is non positive, that is when ⇧ exhibits decreasing di↵erences (evaluated at the
optimum). Rigourously, concavity of ⇧ in k is nedeed at this stage, to allow such a


































Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Additional renewable capacity (log) 2.648 3.709 0 13.045
Natural gas price 5.312 22.133 1.48 11.81
Wind availability 11.915 22.133 0 94.918
Sun availability 4.222 0.558 2.4 5.7
State size 200.031 250.912 4.002 1717.854
Growth in electricity sales 0.013 0.035  0.215 0.187
Electricity price 8.195 2.72 3.89 18.06
Production % renew. energy 0.011 0.028 0 0.248
Production % nuclear energy 0.177 0.182 0 0.808
Experience with ISO/RTO 3.796 4.492 0 14
GDP per capita 40.161 9.486 21.524 72.454
Population 6.016 6.52 0.491 38.041
Democrat governor 0.443 0.497 0 1
LofCV indicator 1.802 1.313 0 4
Policy 1.822 1.632 0 6
Tax 1.199 1.200 0 4
